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ABSTRACT

Title II of the JOBS Act has expanded the opportunities for
entrepreneurial ventures to raise funds from accredited investors via
online equity crowdfunding platforms in the United States. Over $1.4
billion in capital has been committed by the accredited investors in
Title II platforms since 2013, yet little is known about how venture
characteristics influence the success of raising funds from investors via
online equity crowdfunding platforms. Further, it is not known whether
online equity crowdfunding is supplementing or replacing traditional
venture funding sources. To address these gaps in our knowledge,
we draw on research in traditional offline risk capital investments
and we evaluate the effects of market, execution and agency risks
on equity crowdfunding success by examining 337 ventures that
engaged in equity crowdfunding under Title II. We find evidence
consistent with investors in online equity crowdfunding platforms
giving consideration to all three types of risks. We also find that
investors in equity crowdfunding platforms are particularly responsive
to the venture ability to attract traditional venture capital funding
prior to engaging in equity crowdfunding. These results suggest that
online equity crowdfunding platforms are supplementing rather than
replacing traditional venture funding sources.
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Introduction
New business ventures typically require funding to develop from ideas into successful businesses. Business angel (BA) investors play an important role in this process. Estimates suggest
that over 300,000 angel investors committed $24.6 billion in capital to new entrepreneurial
ventures in the United States in 2015 (Ortmans 2016). Prior to 2013, the process of raising
funding from angel investors typically required the entrepreneurs to meet with potential
angel investors in person because of legal restrictions on public solicitation by new ventures
(Foley and Paul 2015). Recent regulatory changes have significantly expanded public fundraising opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures to include internet-based equity crowdfunding platforms (SEC 2015) and estimates suggest that investors committed over $1.4
billion to new ventures via online equity crowdfunding platforms (Crowdnetic 2016). Yet,
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relatively little is known about the factors that affect the success of fundraising via online
equity crowdfunding platforms or whether online equity crowdfunding is replacing or complementing traditional venture funding sources. These are the gaps in research that we begin
to address in the present study.
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) became law in 2012. The new legislation was passed in part as a response to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and it directed
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to relax the rules on public solicitation for
new ventures to make it easier for entrepreneurs to raise funds (SEC 2015). The JOBS Act
contains several provisions, including Title II which became effective in September 2013.
Title II of the JOBS Act removed the public solicitation restriction and the requirement for
securities registration for new ventures seeking to raise funds from accredited investors.
Accredited investors are individuals with annual income exceeding $200,000 or having assets
in excess of $1 million excluding the primary residence (SEC 2013). The passage of the JOBS
Act spurred the evolution of many Title II equity-based crowdfunding platforms which connect entrepreneurial ventures with potential investors. A theoretical analysis of equity-based
crowdfunding suggested that information asymmetry problems are amplified in internet-mediated contexts and this may lead to adverse selection and moral hazard risks undermining the viability of online equity crowdfunding platforms (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb
2013). However, very little is known about how entrepreneurs, investors, and platforms may
be able to mitigate the risks or about the types of ventures that can be successful in fundraising capital via equity crowdfunding from accredited investors under Title II.
We draw on research in traditional offline entrepreneurial finance that recognizes that
three distinct types of potential risks affect investment decisions in early stage ventures:
market, execution, and agency risks (Carpentier and Suret 2015). Market risks are external
to the venture and they reflect the uncertainty facing a new product or service in the market.
Among other concerns, market risks include market size, growth trends, and existing competition. Execution risks are internal to the entrepreneurial venture. This category of risks
emphasizes the importance of the entrepreneurial team in executing a business strategy
and proving the viability of the business model. Agency risk highlights the potential misalignment between investor and entrepreneur interests which in conjunction with information asymmetry can undermine the investor ability to capture financial rewards from their
investments. We extend the risk framework to acknowledge additional challenges that
emerge in computer-mediated communication typically dominated by text, which makes
it challenging to transmit non-verbal information (Picard 2003). We examine the effects of
specific market, execution, agency, and computer-mediation factors using data from 337
projects that sought to raise funding on Crowdfunder, a leading Title II equity crowdfunding
platform in the United States. We find that all four factors can affect the success of fundraising
by entrepreneurial ventures, but investors in equity crowdfunding platforms appear to focus
specifically on external validation by traditional professional venture capital (VC) investors.
The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. First, we review the emergent
research on equity crowdfunding. Then we draw on the entrepreneurial finance literature
to develop the theoretical framework in our study. Next, we describe the data and the methodology in our study and we present the empirical results. We conclude with the discussion
of emergent insights as well as our contributions to theory and practice and opportunities
for future research.
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Crowdfunding overview
Crowdfunding generally refers to “a financing method in which money is raised through
soliciting relatively small individual investments or contributions from a large number of
people” (SEC 2016). Crowdfunding covers a broad range of existing and emergent phenomena. Four general types of crowdfunding are commonly recognized (Cumming and Johan
2013b). Donation-based crowdfunding allows individual donors to engage in philanthropic
endeavors. For example, the GoFundMe.org platform facilitates donations to a variety of
individual and organizational causes. Reward-based crowdfunding, exemplified by
KickStarter, enables project backers to commit funds to a wide variety of entrepreneurial
and artistic projects (Mollick 2014). The project backers are incentivized by different types
of rewards, but receive no equity in the projects. For example, backers may receive tickets
to attend an artistic performance funded though the commitments or they may receive a
discount on a gadget that the entrepreneurs plan to develop. Reward-based crowdfunding
also encompasses royalty-based models. For example, BandBackers.com allows music fans
to fund their favorite bands in exchange for a royalty from future music sales. Loan-based
crowdfunding is the third type of crowd-supported financing that is available to both businesses and individuals. FundingCircle is an example of a company that enables businesses
to borrow from individual lenders through an online lending marketplace. LendingClub
operates a very successful peer-to-peer lending marketplace for unsecured loans made to
individuals.
Equity-based crowdfunding is the fourth type of crowdfunding and it captures crowdfunding that involves issuance of any type of securities (equity, convertible preferred equity,
etc.) that give the holders an ownership stake in the company in exchange for capital. Equitybased crowdfunding has a very different profile from other types of crowdfunding in terms
of motivations of capital providers as well as associated risks and rewards. For example,
whereas donation-based capital contributions are typically driven by philanthropic motives
(Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher 2013), equity-based capital commitments are
motivated by profit seeking (Belleflamme, Omrani, and Peitz 2015). Although loan-based
and equity-based crowdfunding share the profit motive, they differ in terms of the risk/
reward profile. Lending to businesses or individuals via crowdfunding platforms is typically
done for a fixed, relatively short period, typically 6–36 months, with an interest rate that is
specified at the time of loan origination (Emekter et al. 2015). Equity-based investments in
early stage ventures carry much more uncertainty compared to loan-based crowdfunding.
Equity holders in early stage ventures typically have a much more uncertain liquidity horizon
and much higher risk of losing their investment. Research on outcomes in informal capital
investments suggests that at least 47% of investments lead to losses and 34% of investments
in early stage ventures result in complete loss of invested capital (Mason and Harrison 2002).
Studies also show that it typically takes 5–7 years for early investors to achieve liquidity
(Sudek 2006). Table 1 summarizes the key differences in crowdfunding capital provider motivations as well risk-reward profile associated with different types of crowdfunding.
In part because equity crowdfunding is a relatively recent phenomenon in the United
States, much of the published research on equity crowdfunding has been done in other
countries. Australia was a pioneer in equity crowdfunding because the Australian financial
legislation did not explicitly prohibit it. The Australian Small-Scale Offering Board (ASSOB)
was established in 2005 as the first platform of its kind brokering fundraising by small
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Table 1. Crowdfunding types, capital provider motives, risks and rewards.
Crowdfunding type
and examples of
platforms
Donation-based
GoFundMe
Kiva
Reward

Kickstarter
IndieGogo
Loan

Capital provider motives
Philanthropy

Risks
Limited, because the donors do
not expect the return of funds

Utilitarian, e.g. interest in a
product/service being
developed

Most projects deliver the
promised rewards, but the
delivery is often delayed (Mollick
2014)

Hedonic, e.g. interest in an
artistic project being
developed
Financial – earning interest
on the principal

LendingClub
FundingCircle
Equity

Crowdfunder
Seedrs

6–36 month term
Relatively low risk of loss of
principal

Financial – earning a
premium on the
investment through a
liquidity event.

5–7 year term.

Relatively high risk of loss of
investment.

Rewards
Socio-emotional
rewards from helping
others
Product, service or
performance

Interest payment,
typically in the 6–12%
range

50%+ annual return on
the invested capital
for successful
ventures.

businesses (Sandlund 2012). A study of factors that are correlated with successful crowdfunding in the ASSOB showed that the number of board members and the size of the equity
offering (negative coefficient) were significantly correlated with the amount of funding
received (Ahlers et al. 2015). Switzerland is another market that has proven to be a fertile
ground for equity crowdfunding (Salomon 2015). A study focusing on the dynamics of fundraising followed 492 projects on a crowdfunding platform in Switzerland showed that the
first days after a project announcement to the public serve as a good indicator of the project’s
chances of success. Successful projects gather support quickly, and the early support translates into successful fundraising campaigns (Beier and Wagner 2016). The United Kingdom
legalized equity crowdfunding in 2011, which led to the emergence of several equity crowdfunding platforms (Harrison 2013). An analysis of 541 equity crowdfunded projects on
Crowdcube (UK) showed that prior awards, professional investor backing, previous crowdfunding experience, grants, patents, and an advisory board are all positively correlated with
crowdfunding success (Ralcheva and Roosenboom 2016). A study of an equity crowdfunding
platform focusing specifically on angel investors in the United States revealed that syndicate
investments, in which a well-known angel investor or a venture capitalist take the leading
role in conducting the due diligence on potential investment opportunities, dominate the
Angel.co platform investment activity (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2016).
Information asymmetry has been the dominant theoretical perspective guiding the
research in equity crowdfunding (Ahlers et al. 2015; Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher
2014). The studies applying the information asymmetry lens tend to frame the research
questions from the perspective of how can the entrepreneurs who seek funding signal the
quality of their venture to potential investors. While information asymmetry certainly presents a significant problem in the fundraising contexts, prior research has largely overlooked
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the fact that different types of ventures have inherently different risk/reward profiles independent of what entrepreneurs may be able to signal to potential investors. Title II equity
crowdfunding is only open to accredited investors and angel investors have adopted the
new investment opportunities available to them under Title II (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb
2016). In the next section, we draw on extant research on traditional offline angel investors
and we develop our research framework that focuses on different types of risks that can
arise in equity investments as well as recognizes the additional challenges that exist in the
context of online equity crowdfunding platforms.

Research framework and hypotheses
Market risk
Prior research on risk capital has shown that investors in early stage ventures typically consider three general types of risk when making an investment decision: market risk, execution
risk and agency risk (Carpentier and Suret 2015). Market risk reflects the inherent uncertainty
about the market success of early stage ventures. Market risk is largely due to factors that
are beyond management control. For example, overall market size, growth trend, clients,
unforeseen competition, etc. Market risk has been shown to be the top reason for the rejection of investment opportunities by professional angel investor groups (Carpentier and Suret
2015; Maxwell, Jeffrey, and Lévesque 2011). The stage of the proposed venture is frequently
cited as the key reason for an investment rejection (Paul, Whittam, and Wyper 2007). Ventures
in the idea/concept stage carry the greatest risk because ideas entail uncertainty about both
the founders’ ability to develop the idea into a product/service and its market potential. The
progression of a venture from an idea/concept to a prototype removes some uncertainty
about the venture’s ability to actually develop the product, however the market risk, i.e.
whether the product/service will be commercially successful, remains. As ventures continue
to develop their products, the next challenge is to “show traction” in the market, i.e. to demonstrate sales potential to consumers for business-to-consumer (B2C) ventures or to show
success in signing corporate clients for business-to-business (B2B) ventures (Feld and
Mendelson 2016). As the ventures progress from a concept to a prototype to an actual
business that has clients and revenues, market risk is reduced. Successful consumer product
launches and signings of marquee corporate clients are commonly interpreted by risk capital
investors as market validation (Maxwell, Jeffrey, and Lévesque 2011). Online platform-mediated equity crowdfunding exposes the investors to a range of potential market risks. We
expect that the accredited investors participating in online equity crowdfunding platforms
will seek to reduce the market risk by focusing on later stage ventures and more specifically,
they will focus on external market validation of the product/service ventures that are seeking
funding.
H1a: Ventures that have completed product/service development are more likely to raise funding
in equity crowdfunding campaigns than early stage ventures (ideas, concepts and prototypes).
H1b: Ventures that have large corporate clients are more likely to raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns than ventures lacking such clients.

Research on venture funding has also highlighted that potential investors are looking for
disruptive innovations as an important criterion for venture funding (Metrick and Yasuda
2010). Incremental innovations are perceived to be at a disadvantage when entering
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established markets because incumbents typically react very aggressively to the introduction
of incremental innovations by upstarts and possess greater resources to market their own
products (Kuester, Homburg, and Robertson 1999). Consequently, startups offering incremental innovations are unlikely to succeed in head-to-head competition with incumbents.
Disruptive innovations that can offer a substantive competitive advantage to new entrepreneurial ventures have greater chances of success and they are more likely to attract funding
(Christensen, Johnson, and Rigby 2002). Patents often serve as the strongest evidence of
significant practical innovation (Dutta and Folta 2016; Häussler, Harhoff, and Müller 2012).
Patents also provide protection for startups from potential imitation by others and thus they
can offer a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Hsu and Ziedonis 2008).
H2a: Ventures that have filed for patents are more likely to raise funding in equity crowdfunding
campaigns than ventures that have not filed for patents.
H2b: Ventures that hold patents are more likely to raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns than ventures that do not have patents.

Execution risk
Execution risk captures the factors related to the difficulty of execution or implementation
of a product or service as well as challenges that may arise with the execution of the business
strategy and business model (Feeney, Haines, and Riding 1999; Sudek 2006). Entrepreneurial
ventures require a diverse portfolio of management skills to succeed: product development,
sourcing, manufacturing, marketing, and financial management among them (Lazear 2004).
Single entrepreneurs are unlikely to possess the full complement of required skills. Prior
research has shown that venture capitalists prefer entrepreneurial teams over single entrepreneurs (Hsu 2007). Angel investors are also known to look for entrepreneurs with prior
industry experience in the target market as well as prior entrepreneurial experience (Maxwell,
Jeffrey, and Lévesque 2011). Previous entrepreneurial experience is important for potential
investors because early stage investors are typically dependent on the new venture either
being sold or progressing to a public stock offering to achieve liquidity and realize the
financial rewards of their investment. Entrepreneurs with prior experience of successful exits
are aware of the structural investor requirements and the exit motivation among the investors. Research has also shown that venture capitalists prefer balanced teams that are comprised of both young entrepreneurs with new ideas and more seasoned executives who can
guide successful execution of the entrepreneurial vision (Hsu 2007).
H3a: Single entrepreneurs are less likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding
campaigns than entrepreneurial teams comprised of 2 or more members.
H3b: Serial entrepreneurs are more likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
H3c: Entrepreneurs with prior experience in the target industry are more likely to raise funding
in equity crowdfunding campaigns.
H3d: Larger teams are more likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns.

Agency risks
Agency risk arises from information asymmetry between the entrepreneurs and the potential
investors. Entrepreneurs know more about the business prospects of their venture and the
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potential challenges than the investors. This can lead to opportunism which is more common
among younger, smaller firms (Noe and Rebello 1996). Angel investors typically mitigate the
agency risk by close involvement in the entrepreneurial ventures in which they invest (Paul,
Whittam, and Wyper 2007), but online platform-mediated investment in geographically
distant ventures makes active angel investor engagement in the entrepreneurial ventures
very challenging (Morrissette 2007). In such circumstances, potential investors would be
looking for another professional angel investor or a venture capital firm to take the lead role
in providing close monitoring of the early stage ventures. Research on an angel-oriented
equity crowdfunding platform Angel.co has shown that syndicate-based investments in
which a well-known angel investor or a venture capitalist takes the lead role, dominate
successful fundraising (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2016). Consequently, we expect that
companies that attracted funding from an experienced angel investor or a venture capitalist
would be more likely to receive capital commitments from other accredited investors on
equity crowdfunding platforms.
H4a: Ventures that have already attracted funding from established angel investors would be
more likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns.
H4b: Ventures that have already attracted funding from professional venture capital firms would
be more likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns.

Computer mediation challenges
Prior research on the venture screening process by angel investors and venture capitalists
has commonly highlighted the importance of the entrepreneur characteristics in the investment decisions (Chen, Yao, and Kotha 2009). For example, prior research has noted the
importance of entrepreneurial passion and determination as well as trustworthiness in successful venture fundraising (Murnieks et al. 2016). Lack of passion and determination undermines investor confidence that entrepreneurs can persevere through many challenges likely
to be faced by entrepreneurial ventures. Entrepreneur trustworthiness is also critical for the
investor to feel confident that the entrepreneur can be trusted with investor funds (Maxwell,
Jeffrey, and Lévesque 2011). Computer-mediated equity crowdfunding platforms typically
rely on text-based narratives to provide the information about the ventures seeking funding
to potential investors. However, text-based information makes the transmission of non-verbal
cues challenging (Bos et al. 2002; Garrison, Anderson, and Archer 1999). Therefore, equity
crowdfunding platforms pose a significant challenge in allowing the entrepreneurs to communicate with potential investors. One way that entrepreneurs can overcome this challenge
is using videos to pitch their business to potential investors. Videos allow the entrepreneurs
not only to communicate factual information, but also to express their level of passion and
commitment to the venture success. The use of videos has been highlighted as an important
tool available to entrepreneurs in reward-based crowdfunding (Mollick 2014). We expect
that successful entrepreneurs in equity crowdfunding platforms will make use of videos in
communication with potential investors as well.
H5a: Ventures that use video in their project descriptions will be more likely to successfully raise
funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns.
H5b: Ventures that use video featuring the founders in their project descriptions will be more
likely to successfully raise funding in equity crowdfunding campaigns.
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Data and methodology
We collected the data for our study from Crowdfunder, a Los Angeles based Title II equity
crowdfunding platform. Crowdfunder was established in 2011 with the anticipation of the
JOBS Act passage and it has grown to become among the most active equity crowdfunding
platforms in the United States (Crowdfunder 2016). We scraped the data about the individual
projects directly from the Crowdfunder web site. Two graduate assistants were provided
with a coding schema and engaged in coding the project descriptions. The coders met and
resolved the disagreements to generate the final data-set. The interrater reliability was 0.94
which is acceptable (James, Demaree, and Wolf 1984). Table 2 summarizes the list of variables,
coding schema and the descriptive statistics for the data that we collected on 337 ventures
posted on Crowdfunder September 2013 through December 2016.
To evaluate the effects of market, execution and agency risks as well as the use of video
in communications with potential investors we evaluated a series of logistic regression models with success as the dependent variable. Success is defined as a venture having attracted
the full minimum issue amount in an online equity crowdfunding campaign.

Results
Factors influencing equity crowdfunding success
In our first model, we examined the effects of the market risk related factors on the likelihood
of raising the full amount of funding. The results revealed that only market traction evident
in the B2B ventures seeking funding having signed corporate clients had a significant positive
effect on the likelihood of success (B = 1.193, p < 0.001). 15.2% of the B2B companies that
had marquee corporate clients were successful in their equity crowdfunding campaign vs.
only 4.4% success rate for B2B companies that did not have marquee corporate clients. The
company stage (idea, beta, or finished product) and patents had no effects. The results are
summarized in Model I column in Table 3.
In the next step, we examined the effects of execution risk related factors on the likelihood
of a successful equity crowdfunding campaign. We found no statistically significant effects
for single-entrepreneur led ventures, industry or previous entrepreneurial experience, or
entrepreneurial team composition on the likelihood of success. The results are summarized
in Model II column in Table 3.
Focusing on the agency risk related factors, we found that only the involvement of professional venture capitalists was positively associated with the equity crowdfunding success
(B = 2.3, p < 0.001). Projects with VC involvement were 39% likely to succeed as compared
with 4.2% that had no VC involvement. We found no support for the professional angel
investor involvement. The results are shown in Model III column in Table 3.
The evaluation of computer mediation related factors revealed that while the presence
of a video in the funding solicitation was positively associated with equity crowdfunding
success (B = 1.01, p < 0.05). Having a video increased the likelihood of success from 3.4% to
11.2%. The presence of the entrepreneur in the video had no effect. The results are summarized in Model IV column in Table 3.
Finally, we examined the effects of the combination of all variables reflecting market, execution, agency and computer mediation related factors on the success of crowdfunding. The
results revealed that when all variables a reconsidered, only the involvement of professional
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Table 2. Variables, coding schema, and descriptive statistics.
Variable name
Venture_stage

Corporate_clients

Patents_pending
Patents_issued
Single_entrepreneur
Industry_experience

Serial_entrepreneur

Team_size

Angel_investors
VC_investment
Video
Entrepreneur_video
B2B
Industry_sector

Pre-issue market cap

Minimum issue amount

Coding schema
Idea – venture is at the idea/concept stage
Beta – a beta or a prototype has been
developed
Product – the product or service has been
developed and it is offered to potential
clients
For B2B ventures
1 - the company has large corporate clients
0 – otherwise
B2C companies were coded as 0
1 – the company has pending patent
applications
0 – none
1 – the company has received patents
0 – none
1 – single entrepreneur
0 – otherwise
Founder(s) have experience in the target
industry
1 – yes
0 – no
At least one of the founders has prior
entrepreneurial experience
1 – yes
0 – no
Number of founders

1 – the company has received funding from
a professional angel investor
0 – none
1 – the company has received funding from
a venture capital firm
0 – none
1 – venture description contains a video
0 – none
1 – founder(s) appears in the video
0 – the founder(s) is not in the video
1 – B2B ventures
0 – otherwise
Commerce & industry
Consumer goods
Energy
Financial
Healthcare
Materials
Services
Technology
Company value prior to receiving funding,
in $

The minimum amount of funding sought by
the venture, in $

Descriptive statistics
Ideas – 12.2%
Beta / Prototype – 25.2%
Product – 62.6%
37.1% of the companies were B2B and had
signed large corporate clients

7.1% of the ventures had pending patent
applications
14.5% of the ventures held patents
43.3% of the ventures are led by a single
entrepreneur
81.3% of the entrepreneurial teams had
experience in the target industry
9.5% of entrepreneurial teams included
serial entrepreneurs
Min = 1
Max = 26
Mean = 5.22
St. dev. = 7.7
15.4% received funding from a professional
angel investor
12.2% received funding from a venture
capital firm
63.8% of the campaigns included a video
30.6% of the campaigns included a video of
the entrepreneur
5.8% of the companies were B2B
Commerce & industry – 5.3%
Consumer goods – 12.2%
Energy – 2.4%
Financial – 11.9%
Healthcare – 3.9%
Materials – 1.5%
Services – 30.6%
Technology – 32.3%
Average: $16.3 million
Min: $0
Max: $500 million
Mode: $5 million
Mean: $2.07 million
Max: $40 million
Min: $40,000
Mode: $500,000
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued).
Variable name
Success
Partial_success

Coding schema
The campaign met or exceeded the
minimum issue amount
The campaign met at least 50% of the
minimum issue amount

Descriptive statistics
8.9% of the campaigns reached or exceeded
their minimum issue amount
23.1% of the campaigns reached at least
50% of their minimum issue amount

Table 3. Factors affecting equity crowdfunding success.
Model I Market risk
Company stage
Idea
Beta
Product
Corporate clients
Patents pending
Patents issued
Single entrepreneur
Entrepreneur industry
experience
Serial entrepreneur
Team size
Angel investors
VC investors
Video
Entrepreneur in video
Issue minimum
B2B
Pre-issue market cap
−2 log likelihood
Nagelkerke R2

–0.157
–0.182
–0.183
1.193***
1.021
−0.627

Model II Execution risk

183.5
0.12

Model IV Computer
mediation

−0.119
1.127
−0.608
0.010

−0.022
−0.012

Model III Agency risk

0.012
0.007

0.047
2.3***
0.014
0.011
166.8
0.22

1.01*
0.603
0.017
0.008
191.7
0.07

Model V All factors

Model VI

–0.113
–0.192
–0.196
0.435
0.021
0.033
0.180
0.521

–0.102
–0.201
–0.188
0.223
0.025
0.124
0.152
0.632

0.098
0.915
0.198
2.2***
0.544
0.366
0.003
0.010

0.113
0.877
0.244
1.6**
0.498
0.457
−0.002
−0.003
−0.432
44.7
0.19

158.3
0.27

*

p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

venture capital investors has a significant positive effect on the equity crowdfunding success
(B = 2.2, p < 0.001). The results are summarized in Model V column in Table 3.

5.2. Robustness checks
Endogeneity due to simultaneous causality, which is a common concern in panel data analysis, is not a significant concern in our results because the independent variables in our
data-set are known at the initiation of an equity crowdfunding campaign, while the outcome
is only known at the conclusion of the campaign. Hence, the outcome cannot affect the
predictors.
Interpretation of analytical insights based on panel data necessitates an evaluation of
model robustness. Logistic regression parameter estimation is known to be sensitive to
outliers in the data. Although the majority of our predictors are binary variables, we reevaluated the parameter estimates in our models using the robust logistic regression technique
developed by Bianco and Yohai (1996), Bianco and Martínez (2009). The analysis produced
values which were similar to the original estimates in our results, indicating no significant
outlier effects in our model parameter estimates.
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To further evaluate the robustness of our results, we followed the recommendations of
Angrist and Pischke (2008) and we replicated the analysis with a related, but different
dependent variable. Crowdfunder, the equity crowdfunding platform that serves as the
context for our study, supports partial fundraising. Crowdfunder will release the funds committed by investors to the entrepreneurs even if a particular campaign does not reach its
target. Prior research has suggested that equity crowdfunding campaigns that reach at least
50% of their goal are likely to be successful (Vismara 2015). To evaluate the robustness of
our results, we replicated the analysis and examined the effects of market, execution, agency
risks, and computer mediation challenges on the venture ability to secure at least half of the
required funding.
The assessment of factors related to market risk revealed that the company stage, corporate clients (B = 0.868, p < 0.001), pending patent applications (B = 0.094, p < 0.05) and
issued patents (B = 0.033, p < 0.05) were all positively correlated with the venture ability to
secure at least half of the funding goal. 33.6% of the B2B companies that had signed corporate clients reached at least 50% of the funding goal, whereas only 15.8% of the B2B companies that did not mention marque clients reached that target. 25% of the companies that
had secured patents were successful in raising at least 50% of the target amount, whereas
only 18.5% of the companies without patents reached at least 50% of the target. The results
are shown in Model I column in Table 4.
Focusing on execution related risks, we find that ventures led by experienced entrepreneurs are more likely to secure funding (B = 0.829, p < 0.01). 40.6% of the ventures led by
serial entrepreneurs were successful in raising at least 50% of the target capital, compared
to 21.1% partial success rate for ventures without serial entrepreneurs among the founders.
The results are shown in Model II column in Table 4.
Table 4. Factors affecting equity crowdfunding success.
Model I Market risk
Company stage
idea
beta
product
Corporate clients
Patents pending
Patents issued
Single entrepreneur
Entrepreneur
industry
experience
Serial entrepreneur
Team size
Angel investors
VC investors
Video
Entrepreneur in
video
B2B
Issue minimum
Pre issue market cap
−2 log likelihood
Nagelkerke R2
*

Model II Execution risk

Model III Agency risk

Model IV Computer
mediation

Model V All factors

−1.824*
1.89*
0.868***
0.094*
0.033***

−0.882

338.5
0.11

p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

0.544
0.070
0.073
−0.015
0.096

−0.134
1.021
0.829*
0.053

0.053
−0.030

Model VI

0.003
−0.027
346.9
0.08

0.98***
1.477***

−0.004
−0.035
326.4
0.16

0.734*
0.054
−0.007
−0.041
353.4
0.05

0.084
0.039
0.87*
1.35***
0.433
0.039
0.002
−0.015
317.3
0.2

0.772
0.323
0.068
0.015
−0.013
0.103
0.072
0.013
0.540
1.3*
0.677
0.062
0.003
−0.007
−0.043
82
0.18
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Table 5. Hypotheses and empirical evidence.
Hypotheses
Market risks
H1a: Later stage ventures (+)
H1b: Corporate clients (+)
H2a: Pending patent applications (+)
H1b: Patents issued (+)
Execution risks
H3a: Single entrepreneur (-)
H3b: Industry experience (+)
H3c: Serial entrepreneur (+)
H3d: Team size (+)
Agency risks
H4a: Professional angel investors (+)
H4b: VC backing (+)
Computer mediation
H5a: Use of video (+)
H5b: Entrepreneur in video (+)

Empirical results
Partially supported
Partially supported
Partially supported
Partially supported
Not supported
Not supported
Partially supported
Not supported
Partially supported
Supported
Partially supported
Not supported

In terms of agency risk-related factors, we find that both professional angel investor backing (B = 0.98, p < 0.001) and venture capital backing (B = 1.477, p < 0.001) are positively
associated with partial fundraising success. 51.9% of ventures that secured professional
angel investor backing prior to the equity crowdfunding campaign were success in raising
at least 50% of the target amount versus 17.4% partial success rate for ventures without
professional angel investor backing. 61% of the ventures that secure VC investor backing
were success in raising at least 50% of the target amount versus 17% partial success rate for
ventures without VC investor backing. The results are shown in Model III in Table 4.
The assessment of the use of video in investment solicitation, we find that it is positively
associated with the partial funding success (B = 0.734, p < 0.05). 27.4% of the ventures that
posted a video were successful in raising at least 50% of the target funding, whereas only
13.8% of the ventures without a video reached at least 50% of the target amount. The examination of the combination of market, execution, agency and computer mediation factors
reveals that only professional angel investor participation (B = 0.87, p < 0.05) and venture
capital backing (B = 1.35, p < 0.001) show statistically significant effects in the full model
(Model V in Table 4). The results affirm the robustness of insights from the primary
analysis.
Table 5 summarizes the results in terms of the associated hypotheses.

Discussion
In this study, we drew on research in traditional risk capital finance which emphasizes that
investors in entrepreneurial ventures face three different types of risk: market, execution and
agency risks, and we examined factors that can affect successful equity-based capital fundraising by entrepreneurial ventures in equity crowdfunding platforms in the United States.
We expanded the framework to reflect specific challenges that can arise in computer-mediated communication contexts. We evaluated the proposed framework in the context of a
leading Title II equity crowdfunding platform in the United States. We analyzed venture-level
data from 337 entrepreneurial investment solicitations by focusing on the specific market,
execution, and agency risks as well as the use of video to overcome computer-mediated
communication challenges. We find that when we consider each type of risk separately,
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market traction and professional investor involvement are predictive of successful equity
crowdfunding from accredited investors under Title II. We also find that entrepreneur use of
video to communicate the information about their venture to potential investors is also
positively correlated with successful fundraising. However, when we consider all factors
simultaneously, only professional venture capital involvement in a venture remains as a
statistically significant factor associated with the venture’s ability to raise the full amount of
the required funding in online equity crowdfunding.
Our evaluation of the results robustness through the examination of the venture ability
to raise at least half of the funding goal reveals that several other venture characteristics,
e.g. the stage of the venture (idea/prototype/completed product), entrepreneurial team
composition (single entrepreneur, prior entrepreneurial experience) may affect partial equity
crowdfunding success when we consider market, execution and agency risks separately.
Ventures in the idea stage and ventures comprised of a single entrepreneur are less likely
to be successful in attracting at least half of the requested capital, whereas serial entrepreneurs are more likely to attract at least half of the requested capital. However, only professional angel investor and/or venture capital involvement are significant when the market,
execution, agency, and computer mediation factors are considered simultaneously.
The results of our study suggest that potential investors in equity crowdfunding platforms
rely on a simple rule (a heuristic) in making their investment decisions. The key factor is
whether a venture is already backed by professional VC investors prior to the engagement
in an online equity crowdfunding campaign. The heuristic likely reflects investor perceptions
that ventures that successfully raised funding from professional investors offline prior to
engaging with the equity crowdfunding platforms had already successfully navigated the
traditional VC due diligence process and they will benefit from close engagement of professional investors in the execution of the business strategy. In essence, investors on
Crowdfunder appear to be freeriding on the efforts of traditional professional investors in
venture quality assessment and stewardship.

Theoretical contributions
Our study makes a number of contributions to theory. First, we answer the recent call for
integration of interdisciplinary theories in crowdfunding research (McKenny et al. 2017). We
draw on research in traditional offline entrepreneurial finance and we develop a novel theoretical lens for examining venture success in equity crowdfunding. Much of the published
research on equity crowdfunding has focused on information asymmetry (Ahlers et al. 2015;
Belleflamme, Lambert, and Schwienbacher 2014), i.e. the entrepreneur knowing more than
potential investors about the prospects of the venture, as the key challenge in equity crowdfunding. The focus on potential information asymmetries largely ignored the fact that entrepreneurial ventures vary greatly in objective market, execution, and agency risks (Carpentier
and Suret 2015). By focusing on the individual risks, we show that all three types of risk may
play a role in online equity crowdfunding. We also expand the framework to acknowledge
the unique challenge that arises in computer-mediated communications. Assessment of
individual entrepreneur quality plays a key role in investment decisions (Clark 2008).
Entrepreneurial passion cannot be easily captured in textual narratives and therefore it
becomes essential for the entrepreneurs to use rich media (video) to engage with potential
investors and communicate the individual level of experience, passion, and commitment.
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We find that the use of video communication is associated with successful fundraising on
Crowdfunder.
Our second contribution to theory is the provision of empirical evidence from a Title II
equity crowdfunding platform in the United States. Except for the study conducted by
Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2016), all other published work on equity crowdfunding has
been done outside of the United States. Prior theoretical work has noted that internet mediation amplifies information asymmetry challenges between entrepreneurs and potential
investors and it questioned the potential viability of equity crowdfunding as a whole
(Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2013). Our results demonstrate that online equity crowdfunding can be successful from the entrepreneur perspective. 337 ventures in our data-set
have raised $183 million on Crowdfunder. 78 of 337 ventures raised at least 50% of the target
capital and 30 ventures raised the full amount of target capital. These rates of success compare favorably to the reports focusing on the traditional offline fundraising by entrepreneurs
(Van Osnabrugge 2000; Wiltbank et al. 2009).
Our third theoretical contribution stems from the empirical insights that emerged from
our study. While we identified an extended list of potential factors that may affect the investors’ decision to commit capital to a particular venture via equity crowdfunding platforms,
we find that professional investor involvement prior to the online equity crowdfunding
campaign is the only factor that is predictive of a venture achieving the full funding target
when we consider all factors simultaneously. In other words, while the accredited investors
may consider different types of risks in the evaluation of potential equity crowdfunding
investment opportunities, they appear to primarily rely on a single factor in making their
investment decisions. This factor is whether the venture seeking funding had already secured
funding from traditional professional VCs offline prior to starting the online equity crowdfunding campaign. Backing from professional VCs implies that the venture had successfully
navigated the due diligence process and further, the venture will benefit from professional
support and monitoring in the execution of the business strategy (Colombo and Grilli 2010;
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007). This finding echoes the results from offline (Payne and
Macarty 2002) and online (Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb 2016) contexts which demonstrated that investors often engage in deal syndication to lower the due diligence costs.
However, there is an open concern that, in contrast to traditional deal syndication among
angel and VC investors which expands the pool of expertise in the due diligence process
and improves its quality (Gregson, Mann, and Harrison 2013; Sorenson and Stuart 2001), the
investors in the online equity crowdfunding platforms are simply freeriding on others investors’ due diligence without adding value in the venture screening process. Investor herding
has been noted as another potential concern in online equity crowdfunding (Agrawal,
Catalini, and Goldfarb 2013) and our results suggest that investor herding may be occurring
in Title II crowdfunding platforms.

Implications for practice
Our study also has a number of implications for practice. Our results suggest that online
equity crowdfunding may not be suitable as the only source of venture funding for early
stage ventures, but it can be used to amplify entrepreneurial venture fundraising success
from traditional VCs and potentially obtain additional funding on more favorable terms. The
insights relevant for the individual entrepreneurs also have implications for the operators
of equity crowdfunding platforms.
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The passage of the JOBS Act led to the creation of at least 17 different Title II equity
crowdfunding platforms in the United States (Mamonov, Malaga, and Rosenblum 2017). Our
results suggest that the success of equity crowdfunding platforms will likely depend on the
platforms’ ability to match the right investors with the right kind of ventures. Our analysis
of the Crowdfunder platform suggests that the investors on this platform are looking for
clear evidence of market traction and validation from traditional offline professional investors. This strategy, while rational, may prove to be suboptimal in aggregate because in
essence the investors on the crowdfunding platform are dependent on the decisions made
by other investors. Early stage venture statistics suggest that at about half of VC investments
lead to losses (Mason and Harrison 2002). It is not clear whether the investors participating
in online equity crowdfunding are aware of the associated investment risks.

Limitations and opportunities for further research
Lastly, we should note that no research is without limitations. While we examined venture-level success factors in one of the largest equity crowdfunding platforms in the United
States, our analysis is limited to a single platform and the generalizability of the findings
would need to be assessed across other platforms.
Our study suggests a number of topics for further research. First, while we found that an
investment from an established venture capital firm in a venture seeking to raise funding
on Crowdfunder was correlated with the ability of the venture to attract the full target
amount, only 16 of 41 VC-backed ventures were successful in raising the full amount in our
data-set. Prior research has shown that factors such as the size of the VC firm, the firm’s
reputation, whether the investment is aligned with the VC firm’s expertise and geographical
proximity of the VCs to the investment target can affect venture performance and investor
outcomes after the investment is made (Cumming and Dai 2011; Cumming and Johan 2013;
Guenther, Johan, and Schweizer 2017). It would be important to examine these factors in
future research to understand the possible reasons why an investment from an established
VC firm does not always translate into equity crowdfunding success.
The narratives that entrepreneurs use to communicate the investment opportunities to
potential investors in equity crowdfunding platforms would also merit further examination.
Prior studies have noted that addressing changing environmental conditions may be an
effective appeal strategy for cleantech crowdfunding projects (Cumming, Leboeuf, and
Schwienbacher 2017). It would be important to explore how different external factors as
well as the narrative quality may influence the success of equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
A parallel opportunity for further research concerns investor outcomes. While the initial
results from the Crowdfunder platform demonstrate that entrepreneurs can be successful
in raising capital through equity crowdfunding, it remains to be seen whether investors can
earn the returns that would justify the investment risks. The longer term success of equity
crowdfunding platforms will be dependent on the platforms ability to broker transactions
that benefit both entrepreneurs and investors. As the investments mature, it would be critical
to examine the financial returns earned by the investors and the importance of investment
diversification in the equity crowdfunding platforms.
Another question that merits further examination is whether the investors in equity
crowdfunding platforms are truly freeriding on the due diligence and monitoring efforts of
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traditional VC investors for the venture that engage in the equity crowdfunding platforms
after they receive an investment from a traditional VC. Traditional VCs typically rely on complex legal contracts in structuring their investments. VC contracts commonly specify blocking
votes on the company boards, dilution provisions, conversion terms, and liquidation preferences (Cumming and Johan 2008; Kaplan and Strömberg 2003). It would be of interest to
examine whether the investors in the equity crowdfunding platforms receive any of these
benefits or, alternatively, what mechanisms are available to the investors in equity crowdfunding platforms to achieve the alignment of interests between the investors and the
entrepreneurs.
Lastly, the results of our study reveal that the success factors in equity crowdfunding can
differ substantially across countries. While we found that accredited investors in the United
States participating in equity crowdfunding platforms appear to consider market, execution,
and agency risks when choosing which companies to invest in through equity crowdfunding
platforms, prior research done in Finland, suggested that Finish investors pay little attention
to market or execution factors (Lukkarinen et al. 2016). The study done in Finland concluded
that the success of equity crowdfunding in Finland was primarily dependent on the entrepreneurs’ ability to mobilize their existing contacts to participate in equity crowdfunding
platforms. A study by Ahlers et al. (2015) that examined success factors in equity crowdfunding in Australia discovered that the size of the equity offering and the lack of financial forecasts were both negatively associated with the likelihood of a successful fundraising on the
Australian Small Scale Offerings Board. Ahlers et al. (2015) found no evidence to support the
role of the company advisory board quality, the number of employees, the executive team
education or patents in influencing the success of fundraising on ASSOB. The differing results
across different countries point to a need to better understand how the specific country-level
factors influence the development of equity crowdfunding practices in different
countries.

Conclusion
By drawing on the research on traditional risk capital we developed a novel theoretical lens
for understanding venture success in internet-based equity crowdfunding. The framework
identifies market, execution, agency risks and computer-mediation as the four general types
of challenges that can affect fundraising in equity crowdfunding platforms. The empirical
evaluation of the proposed framework supports the importance of the individual risk types
and it also suggests that investors are likely relying on a limited set of criteria in evaluating
potential investment opportunities in equity crowdfunding. The key factor that is correlated
with successful fundraising is successful procurement of funds from professional venture
capitalists prior to the online equity crowdfunding campaign. The results imply that investors
in online equity crowdfunding platforms are dependent on and are freeriding on the due
diligence and venture development efforts carried out by traditional offline professional
venture capital firms. Therefore, online Title II equity crowdfunding is complementary rather
than a replacement for the traditional venture capital funding sources.
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